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Joint Registration of Trademarks and the
Economic Value of a Trademark System*
PATRICIA KIMBALL FLETCHER**
Americans are trademark conscious people. After a re-
freshing sleep on his BEAUTYREST mattress, the average
American male is awakened by the alarm of a SEIKO clock. He
arises, puts on his FLORSHEIM or GUCCI slippers and walks
on the CALLAWAY or BARWICK carpet to the bathroom. He
brushes his teeth with CREST toothpaste on an ORAL B tooth-
brush and applies NOXZEMA or FOAMY to his beard, to be
removed by a GILLETTE or SCHICK razor. After a stimulat-
ing shower with COAST or DIAL soap, and while listening to
the newscast on a GE or PANASONIC radio, he hurries into
his BVD or JOCKEY underwear, ARROW or CALVIN KLEIN
shirt freshly laundered with ERA from the LAUNDROMAT,
puts on his ROLEX wristwatch and rushes downstairs to
breakfast. In the kitchen, where the linoleum is bright with a
coat of JOHNSON'S WAX, he snatches two slices of SUN-
BEAM or WONDER bread from the TOASTMASTER and
consumes a cup of TASTER'S CHOICE or BRIM coffee and a
glass of MINUTE MAID orange juice taken from the
FRIGIDAIRE or GE refrigerator. After breakfast he enjoys a
MARLBORO or WINSTON cigarette. Should he burn or cut
his finger, he would apply VASELINE petroleum jelly or a
BAND-AID adhesive bandage. He dons his new STETSON hat
and drives his MUSTANG, DATSUN, BMW, or CAMARO au-
tomobile to work. On the way he will be reminded by his
DELCO radio that "Coke Is It." 1
Special thanks to Professor James Mofsky for his help and guidance in writing this
article.
** J.D. candidate, University of Miami School of Law; Associate Editor, University of
Miami Law Review; Reid Scholar.
1. This is an updated version of a famous illustrative paragraph that Abraham Green-
berg first published in 1950. See Greenberg, Trade-Mark Management, 40 TRADE-MARK
REP. 95, 96 (1950). Julius Lunsford has since revised it four times. See Lunsford, Consumers
and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the Market Place, 64 TRADE-MARK REP.
75, 76-77 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks]; Lunsford,
Trademarks: Prestige, Practice, and Protection, 4 Ga. L. Rev. 322, 322 (1970); Lunsford,
Trademarks: First Rights or Last Rites?, 54 TRADE-MARK REP. 792, 794 (1964); Lunsford,
Trade Morals and Famous Brand Names, 41 TRADE-MARK REP. 923, 923 (1951).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The federal trademark system, a combination of common-law
precedent and statutes permitting trademark registration, serves
the special needs of both trademark conscious consumers and pro-
ducers. The system facilitates commercial competition in a com-
plex, impersonal marketplace by protecting the consumer's means
of identifying and selecting products.' The consumer's patronage is
the trademark owner's mainstay, and its continuing existence de-
pends upon preservation of the owner's distinguishing trademark.$
The right of the owner to protect his trademark is therefore of
great importance and value.
a By being the first to use the mark, a trademark owner acquires
a common-law right to prevent others from using a similar mark
on similar goods." This right requires neither state nor federal re-
gistration.' Federal registration under the Lanham Act s is advanta-
geous, however, because it increases the owner's legal rights in the
mark, making the mark itself more valuable.7 Thus, trademark
2. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968).
3. Unless indicated otherwise, the term "trademark" includes the term "service mark"
throughout this article.
4. This right developed through judicial recognition that trademark rights are property
rights. See infra text accompanying notes 58-63.
5. See Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1956).
6. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1051 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
7. Although common-law use and state registration are means of trademark protection,
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owners have significant legal and economic interests in obtaining
federal registration of trademarks.
Federal trademark registration is of similar importance to
joint owners of a single mark. Joint owners seeking joint registra-
tion of a single mark often encounter difficulty, however, because
the Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") adheres to early fed-
eral decisions holding that a trademark's function is to indicate
singleness of commercial source.' Until 1960, the PTO did not rec-
ognize joint ownership of a mark other than by a firm or corpora-
tion, believing joint owners could never represent a single sponsor
of a product.10 Despite a supposed change in policy,1" the PTO still
prefers applications from individuals and single entities." Upon re-
ceiving a request for registration from joint applicants, the PTO
presumes that the parties have incorrectly applied as joint owners
and that they should reapply as a single entity.' 3 Presently, the
average trademark registration process takes at least eighteen
marketing specialists generally prefer the "blanket protection" of federal registration even
though it requires use of the mark in interstate commerce. Reworking an Archaic Patent
System, Trademarks: The Other Mess, CHEMICAL WEEK, Feb. 18, 1981, at 44, 45 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Trademarks: The Other Mess]. "For one thing, it is cheap: the filing fee is only
$35. 'It's the biggest bargain in the world,' says one trademark counsel." Id. at 44. Federal
registration on the principal register constitutes, inter alia, prima facie evidence of the regis-
trant's rights; renders the registrant's rights incontestable to some degree; results in con-
structive notice of the registrant's claim of ownership of the mark; and provides the owner
with the opportunity to litigate matters concerning its trademark rights in federal courts.
See generally M. BERAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRADEMARK PRACTICE 144-45 (1970) (listing
the benefits of federal registration on the supplemental and principal registers).
8. The Commissioner of the PTO is authorized to make rules and regulations for the
conduct of proceedings in the agency. 15 U.S.C. § 1123 (1976)) (original version at ch. 540,
§ 41, 60 Stat. 440 (1946) (Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-596, § 1, 88 Stat. 1949 (1976),
substituted "Patent and Trademark Office" for "Patent Office").
9. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 802.01-.03 (rev. ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as TMEP].
10. See H. ToULMIN, TRADE-MARK HANDBOOK 53 (1957); Derenberg, The Fourteenth
Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 51 TRADE-MARK REP. 777,
795 (1961).
11. TMEP, supra note 9, § 802.03(d). See infra text accompanying notes 113-22, dis-
cussing the PTO's present position. See also Derenberg, supra note 10, at 795.
12. See TMEP, supra note 9, § 802.03(d) (limiting the availability of joint ownership to
particular circumstances).
13. See id.; PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NOTES FROM THE
PATENT OFFICE, pt. 1-A, n.5 (1966).
J. David Sams, Member of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, believes that it is
more accurate to state that the PTO "carefully scrutinizes such applications and makes
appropriate inquiry of the parties identified as joint applicants to make certain that the
mark is not in fact being used by a single legal entity . Letter from J. David Sams to
Patricia K. Fletcher (Aug. 18, 1982).
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months.14 Thus, joint applicants stand to lose substantial time and
money in a competitive commercial market because of the delay
resulting from an attempt at joint registration.
In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,15 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the PTO's view of trade-
marks as an indicator of a single source. Rather, the court recog-
nized that a trademark reflects product quality.16 Although some
commentators have sharply criticized this departure from tradi-
tional notions of trademark function,17 the court's approach was
not new."8  Previously, other commentators considering the
"source" theory of trademark function found it to be obsolete be-
cause it failed to reflect the trademark's primary function of indi-
cating consistent quality to the consumer.1"
These "source" and "quality" theories of trademark function
are often characterized as mutually exclusive.20 Although the legal
and historical development of the two theories of trademark func-
tion are different, neither theory alone makes sense in light of
modern business practices and economic realities. A trademark
may connote the "source" or "sponsorship" of a product, but this
is simply an intrinsic characteristic of a mark derived from its his-
torical roots rather than its sole function. Recent commentators
have refused to limit a trademark to any one function. 2' Even the
PTO, although emphasizing a "single source" theory when refer-
ring to joint registration, has attributed several different functions
14. Trademarks: The Other Mess, supra note 7, at 44.
15. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972).
16. The historical conception of a trade-mark as a strict emblem of source of the
product to which it attaches has largely been abandoned. The burgeoning busi-
ness of franchising has made trade-mark licensing a widespread commercial
practice and has resulted in the development of a new rationale for trade-marks
as representations of product quality. This is particularly true in the case of a
franchise system set up not to distribute the trade-marked goods of the
franchisor, but, as here, to conduct a certain business under a common trade-
mark or trade name. Under such a type of franchise, the trade-mark simply re-
flects the goodwill and quality standards of the enterprise which it identifies.
Id. at 48-49 (footnotes omitted).
17. See, e.g., 1 J. GILSON, TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 1.03[1], at 1-20
(1980); Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks, supra note 1, at 85-86.
18. See 1 J. GILSON, supra note 17, § 1.03[1], at 1-16 to -17.
19. See, e.g., Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REV.
813 (1927).
20. See, e.g., 1 J. GILSON, supra note 17, § 1.03[1] (the subsection is titled Source v.
Quality).
21. See, e.g., S. DIAMOND, TRADEMARK PROBLEMS AND How To AVOID THEM 3-4 (rev. ed.
1981) [hereinafter cited as S. DIAMOND, TRADEMARK PROBLEMS]; 1 J. GILsON, supra note 17,




This article will demonstrate that the PTO has inappropri-
ately emphasized singleness of source in evaluating joint registra-
tion applications. A proper policy regarding joint ownership of
trademarks can develop only through statutory interpretation, ex-
plication of precedent, and analysis of the historical and economic
forces which influenced these legal norms. Thus, this article will
contrast the diversified functions of trademarks in modern society
with their traditional functions, in order to illustrate the usefulness
of our present federal trademark system in a free enterprise
economy.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF TRADEMARK USE
A. History of Trademarks
Trademark use is one of the oldest of established human prac-
tices.23 Ancient Egypt, for example, fixed responsibility for defec-
tive bricks by requiring that each one carry marks traceable to the
brickyard and the particular slave who manufactured it. 4 The
mark was thus a means of determining the physical origin or
source of the brick. Because manufacturing was an individual pro-
cess, no reason existed for joint ownership of trademarks.
Medieval craftsmen were required by statute, administrative
order, or municipal or guild regulation to affix regulatory produc-
tion marks to goods in order to permit detection and punishment
of the individual responsible for a defect.2 These marks, like an-
cient Egyptian brick marks, primarily indicated physical source by
22. In 1967 the Patent Office defined the function of a trademark as follows:
The primary function of a trademark is to distinguish one person's goods from
those of another; but a trademark also serves to indicate to purchasers that the
quality of the goods bearing the mark remains constant, and it serves as the
focal point of advertising to create and maintain a demand for the product.
PATENT OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Q & A ABOUT TRADEMARKS 1 (1967). The PTO's
definition is substantially the same: "The primary function of a trademark is to indicate
origin. However, trademarks also serve to guarantee the quality of the goods bearing the
mark and, through advertising, serve to create and maintain a demand for the product."
PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEFP'T OF COMMERCE, GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERN-
ING TRADEMARKS 1 (rev. ed. 1978).
23. Trademarks may have first been used to brand cattle and other animals long before
man became literate. See Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADE-
MARK REP. 265, 266 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Diamond, Historical Development].
24. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 173, 173 (1949).
25. Schechter, supra note 19, at 814.
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identifying the actual producer of the product." The ability to de-
termine the source of a defect was a form of guild control, essential
to safeguarding the guild's monopoly and collective goodwill,' 7
Jointly owned marks were not necessary, however, because goods
were handcrafted under the direction of a single individual.
From the English middle ages, when the regulatory production
mark originated, through the nineteenth century, local businesses
dominated the marketplace. The consumer and manufacturer were
in close proximity. Thus, the consumer was familiar with the iden-
tity, size, location, and reputation of the local manufacturers from
which he bought goods. s The trademark identified which of these
familiar entities was the source of the purchased goods.'
The technological advances of the industrial revolution, par-
ticularly in communication and transportation, caused the con-
sumer and manufacturer to become distant.8 0 "Self-service retail-
ing remove[d] the consumer even farther from direct contact with
the manufacturer."81 The consumer no longer knew the identity of
the producer of goods," and manufacturers recognized the result-
ing necessity of trademark use as a means of distinguishing their
goods from those of competitors." Although the consumer seldom
knew the source of products bearing a familiar trademark, the con-
sumer instead found that a trademark promised consistent quality
in future purchases.8 Trademarks thus became, and still remain,
26. 3 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
§ 65.1, at 5 (3d ed. 1969); Schechter, supra note 19, at 814.
27. Schechter, supra note 19, at 819.
28. See 1 J. GILSON, supra note 17, § 1.03[1l, at 1-15.
29. See id.
30. See Diamond, The Public Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT. OFF.
Soc'y 528, 537 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Diamond, Public Interest]; see also S. DIAMOND,
TRADEMARK PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at 239-46 (discussing the relationship between trade-
marks and the public interest); Schechter, supra note 19, at 814 (discussing the ramifica-
tions of modern trade).
31. Diamond, Public Interest, supra note 30, at 537; see also S. DIAMOND, TRADEMARK
PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at 245.
32. As a matter of fact, as has been pointed out by the very courts that define
trademarks in terms of ownership or origin, that owing to the ramifications of
modern trade and international distribution of goods from the manufacturer to
the jobber or importer and retailer to the consumer, the source or origin of the
goods bearing a well-known trademark is seldom known to the consumer.
Family Circle, Inc. v. Family Circle Assocs., 332 F.2d 534, 539 (3d Cir. 1964); accord Shred-
ded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918) (L. Hand, J.).
33. See F. UPTON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS 9 (1860) (this book was the
first attempt to collate or digest trademark case law).
34. See FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 650 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Revlon,
Inc. v. La Maur, Inc., 157 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602, 605 (1968). See generally Hanak, The Quali-
[Vol. 36:297
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the symbols bridging the gap between manufacturer and
consumer.
85
B. Statutory Protection of Rights in Trademarks
As consumers in the industrial age began to rely increasingly
on the marks associated with articles of merchandise as an indica-
tor of product quality, trademark protection became a valuable
right. Unfortunately, the common law had not kept pace with the
changing environment in which trademarks were being employed.
The common law's reliance on precedent made adaptation to eco-
nomic reality a slow process. Although mark owners recognized the
value of trademark use, they found it "extremely difficult to prove
the existence and scope of such a value in a court proceeding."8'
By 1791, American businessmen began to demand federal legisla-
tive relief from the random pattern of judicial decisions.
8
7
As is often the case, economic forces prompted statutory
change. Under mounting pressure from all sectors of the business
community, Congress enacted the first federal trademark statute in
1870.88 It provided for registration of trademarks used in local, in-
terstate, and foreign commerce. In 1879 the United States Su-
preme Court declared the Act unconstitutional in the famous
Trade-Mark Cases.39 The Court concluded that Congress did not
have power to regulate trademarks pursuant to the patent and
copyright clause of the United States Constitution. ° The Court
also held that Congress's power to regulate trade under the com-
merce clause did not extend to purely intrastate regulation of
trademarks."1
In 1881, Congress passed a new federal act providing only for
registration of marks used in foreign commerce or commerce with
the Indian tribes."' The 1881 Act, however, was still not responsive
to the business community's need for protection of property rights
ty Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 363 (1974) (emphasizing the
importance of the quality function).
35. Diamond, Public Interest, supra note 30, at 537.
36. 4 R. CALLMANN, supra note 26, § 97.1, at 568.
37. Id. at 568-69 & n.3 (citing F. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW
RELATING TO TRADE MARKS 132 (1925)).
38. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 210.
39. 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
40. Id. at 93-94.
41. Id. at 94-99. The Court did not, however, decide whether Congress had the power to
regulate trademarks in interstate commerce. Id. at 95.
42. Act of Mar. 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502.
19821
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in trademarks used in interstate commerce. Furthermore, the Act
presupposed the existence of a valid trademark under the common
law and did "not affect in any manner the nature or function of [a]
trade-mark."48
Again under pressure to supply a workable federal trademark
law, Congress replaced the 1881 Act with the Trade-Mark Act of
1905." The Act was an improvement over the 1881 Act in that it
provided for registration of trademarks Used in interstate com-
merce as well as for those used in foreign commerce or commerce
with the Indian tribes. Unfortunately, registration of a trademark
under the Act neither enlarged nor abridged the registrant's sub-
stantive common-law rights in the mark." It was accepted law that
federal legislation could not create exclusive substantive trademark
rights and could only provide a registration procedure with pre-
scribed remedies once competitors interfered with property rights
recognized under the common law."
In 1946 Congress changed American trademark law by passing
the Lanham Act.'7 Although it was, and still is, the accepted doc-
trine that trademark ownership originates from use, not registra-
tion, the Act "put federal trade-mark law upon a new footing" and
"put an end to any doubts" about whether Congress could create a
substantive federal trademark law." In passing the Act, Congress
noted the confused state of the law,'" recognizing that ideas con-
cerning trademarks had changed significantly since the passage of
the 1905 Act. In the words of the Committee on Patents, legisla-
tion had "not kept pace with the commercial development." 50 Pas-
43. Edison v. Thomas A. Edison, Jr., Chem. Co., 128 F. 1013, 1014 (C.C.D. Del. 1904).
44. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724.
45. See, e.g., Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538,
543 (1920); Dwinell-Wright Co. v. National Fruit Prod. Co., 129 F.2d 848, 851 (1st Cir.
1942).
46. 4 R. CALLMANN, supra note 26, § 97.2, at 579, § 97.3(a) at 583.
47. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1051 (1976)). Section numbers used in this text refer to sections of the codified
version of the Lanham Act, as do references to the "Act," unless another statute is specified.
48. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 1949) (L. Hand, J.).
See generally 4 R. CALLMANN, supra note 26, § 97 (recognizing that the Lanham Act created
substantive law). The Committee on Patents, in a report submitted to both the House and
Senate concerning the Lanham Act, stated: "There can be no doubt under recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of the constitutionality of a national act giving substantive as distin-
guished from merely procedural rights in trade-marks in commerce over which Congress has
plenary power. .. -." S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Seas. 4, 5-6, reprinted in 1946 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1274, 1277.




sage of the Act, then, was an acknowledgement of the need for the
statutory protection of trademark rights."
III. THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF TRADEMARKS
A. Definition of a Trademark
The Lanham Act, following the language of earlier definitions
of trademarks, 51 states that "[tihe term 'trade-mark' includes any
word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and
distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." 5
The Act expressly provides that once other requirements of the
statute are met, "[n]o trade-mark by which the goods of the appli-
cant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be re-
51. See Carson, Marks for the Marketplace; The Curious World of the Trademark,
AM. HERITAGE, Oct. 1977, at 64, 66.
In justifying the passage of the Lanham Act, the Committee on Patents stated:
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to protect
the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a partic-
ular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the product which it asks
for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of a trade-mark has spent en-
ergy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected in
his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-
established rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark own-
er. . . . Your committee believes the [Lanham Act] accomplishes these two
broad basic principles.
S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 48, at 3.
52. In 1860 Francis Upton defined "trademark" in the first- treatise written on trade-
mark law:
A Trade Mark is the name, symbol, figure, letter, form or device, adopted and
used, by a manufacturer, or merchant, in order to designate the goods that he
manufactures, or sells, and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
another; to the end that they may be known in the market, as his, and thus
enable him to secure such profits as result from a reputation for superior skill,
industry or enterprise.
F. UPTON, supra note 33, at 9.
In 1877 the United States Supreme Court substantially adopted Upton's definition in
McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877). The Court stated:
[A] trade-mark may consist of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form, or device, if
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant in order to designate the
goods he manufactures or sells to distinguish the same from those manufactured
or sold by another, to the.end that the goods may be known in the market as his,
and to enable him to secure such profits as result from his reputation for skill,
industry, and fidelity.
Id. at 254; see Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460, 463 (1893).
The simpler definition in the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 stated that "[t]he term 'trade-
mark' includes any mark which is entitled to registration under the terms of this Act ..
Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 29, 33 Stat. 724, 731.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976) (original version at ch. 540, § 45, 60 Stat. 427, 443 (1946)).
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fused registration on the principal register .. . ."" In 1967 the
Patent Office added a gloss to the statutory definition: "In short, [a
trademark] is a brand name used on goods moving in the channels
of trade.""5
Today, under both statutory language and common-law prece-
dent, a trademark by definition must meet three fundamental re-
quirements. First, it must consist of a device, symbol, name, word,
"or any combination thereof" that the PTO or the courts have
found to constitute a valid mark." Second, a mark must be
adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant. Third, the mark
must identify and distinguish goods sold or manufactured by one
individual from those of another. All these criteria may be met by
joint owners of a trademark without sacrificing the goals of the
trademark system.57 Thus, the definition of trademark at common
law and in the Lanham Act does not preclude joint ownership of
54. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (original version at ch. 540, § 2, 60 Stat. 427, 428 (1946)). For a
brief discussion of the principal register, see supra note 7.
55. PATENT OFFICE, supra note 22, at 1. The PTO dropped this language from its 1978
definition of a trademark, strictly adhering to the language of the Lanham Act. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 22, at 1. Sidney A. Diamond, former Commissioner of the
PTO, maintains that "[1]egally speaking, a 'brand name' is just one variety of a trademark."
S. DIAMOND, TRADEMARK PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at 5. Other commentators agree. See,
e.g., Carson, supra note 51, at 65 ("brand" or "brand name" often used as synonym for
trademark); Lunsford, Trademarks: Prestige, Practice, and Protection, supra note 1, at 326
(trademark synonymous with brand name).
56. A trademark may be a coined word with no meaning at all (Kodak, Dacron,
Exxon), an ordinary word that has no meaning in connection with the product
on which it is used (Camel, Arrow, Dial), a word whose meaning suggests some
quality or function of the product (Raid, Sure, Head and Shoulders), or a coined
word suggesting what the product is or does (Kleenex, Jell-O, Panasonic). It may
be a foreign word, whose English meaning may or may not have some signifi-
cance for the product (Lux, Oreo, Bon Ami). It may be the name of the owner or
founder of the company (Ford, Singer, Gillette), the name of some famous per-
son selected arbitrarily (Lincoln, Cadillac, Yale), or a name from mythology or
literature (Hercules, Ajax, Peter Pan). It may be just initials (RCA, IBM, BVD),
or just numerals (4711, 66), or a combination of both (V-8, A-i). It may be a
pictorial mark, with or without explanatory words (Four Roses, the White Rock
girl, Elsie the cow). And of course these do not exhaust the possibilities.
S. DIAMOND, TRADEMARK PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at 5.
57. In 1974 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that trademark policies
are designed:
(1) to protect the consumer from being misled as to the enterprise, or enter-
prises, from which the goods or services emanate or with which they are associ-
ated; (2) to prevent an impairment of the value of the enterprise which owns the
trademark; and (3) to achieve these ends in a manner consistent with the objec-
tives of free competition.
HMH Publishing Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added); see




B. Trademarks as Property Rights
Common law classified trademarks, and the right to their ex-
clusive use, as intangible property rights,58 distinguishable from
ownership of chattel or land.5 A trademark does not give its owner
an assignable, abstract right to exclusive use of a certain name, let-
ter, mark, device, or symbol.80 A trademark is created and its value
preserved as a result of its use in the marketplace."1 The commer-
cial value of the right derives from the mark owner's expenditure
of time, money, and effort to create a positive consumer response
to the mark. A proprietary right in a trademark therefore is simply
a right to its commercial exploitation.2 Once created, the continu-
ing existence of the right depends on priority of use of the trade-
mark, continuous presence in the marketplace, and protection of
the value associated with the mark."
1. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND JOINT OWNERSHIP
The possibility of joint ownership of trademarks was recog-
nized as early as 1860. As one commentator wrote, "No person,
who is, in law, capable of acquiring and possessing any species of
property, is excluded from the acquisition of property in trade
marks."" According to this theory, if state law permits joint own-
ership of property, then a trademark can be jointly owned. The
judiciary, however, has not always adhered to this liberal approach.
Rather, the courts have imposed the requirement that a trademark
58. "Common-law trade-marks, and the right to their exclusive use, are of course to be
classed among property rights. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413
(1916).
59. The right to use a mark, for example, cannot be transferred in gross. See, e.g.,
United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918); American Broadcasting
Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d 412, 413 (2d Cir. 1941).
60. See F. UPTON, supra note 33, at 22.
61. In United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918), for example, the
United States Supreme Court stated, "There is no such thing as property in a trade-mark
except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which
the mark is employed." Id. at 97; see Lunsford, Trademarks: Prestige, Practice, and Protec-
tion, supra note 1, at 323.
62. See generally Libling, The Concept of Property: Property in Intangibles, 94 LAW
REV. Q. 103, 104, 119 (1978).
63. Cf. Lunsford, Trademarks: Prestige, Practice, and Protection, supra note 1, at 325
(regarding rights to a trademark as dependent on only "priority of adoption and use and
continuous occupancy in the marketplace").
64. F. UPTON, supra note 33, at 19.
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indicate a single source of a product."' The nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century courts, and later the PTO, saw joint ownership
of the property rights associated with a trademark as inconsistent
with a trademark's function to indicate singleness of source." Iron-
ically, both trademark cases and the PTO indicate that mark own-
ership by a corporation, which in turn may be owned by thousands
of individuals, is not inconsistent with this source function. e As
will be demonstrated, the function of trademarks does not prohibit
joint ownership of the intangible property rights in marks by joint
owners any more than it prohibits mark ownership by
corporations."
C. A Trademark's Functions
Changes in the commercial significance of trademarks" have
influenced the views of courts, legislators, and commentators con-
cerning a trademark's economic and legal functions.70 Little uni-
formity of opinion as to a trademark's functions exists among these
groups.7 1 The PTO presently views joint ownership as inconsistent
with a trademark's function as an indicator of source. This position
may be fatal for applicants seeking joint registration of a mark. If a
trademark does not perform a function recognized either by the
courts or the PTO, it may lose either its common-law protection or
its federal registration, or it may even be denied registration alto-
gether. The functions attributed to trademarks thus determine
what marks may be registered, who can own them, and when a
65. See infra text accompanying notes 73-80.
66. Id.
67. See TMEP, supra note 9, § 802.01-.03.
68. See infra notes 100-22, 207-09 and accompanying text.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 30-35.
70. Many courts have reiterated that the "only legally relevant function of a trademark
is to impart information as to the source or sponsorship of the product" to which it is at-
tached. Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1968); see, e.g., Anti-Monopoly,
Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir. 1979); Clairol, Inc. v. Gillette
Co., 389 F.2d 264, 269 (2d Cir. 1968). Other courts and commentators have differed. One
scholar, for example, has stated:
In general, trademarks perform four functions which are deserving of protection
in the courts: (1) to identify one seller's goods and distinguish them from goods
sold by others; (2) to signify that all goods bearing the trademark come from a
single, albeit anonymous, source; (3) to signify that all goods bearing the trade-
mark are of an equal level of quality; and (4) as a prime instrument in advertis-
ing and selling the goods.
1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR CoMPgMrnoN § 3:1(B) (1973 & Supp. 1980); see
also 1 J. GELsoN, supra note 17, § 1.03[1], at 1-14.
71. 3 R. CALLMANN, supra note 26, § 65, at 5-20.
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mark will be protected.
1. THE SOURCE OR ORIGIN FUNCTION
American courts have traditionally viewed the trademark's
function as one of identifying the physical source of trademarked
products."' In the 1916 case of Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Met-
calf," the United States Supreme Court held that "[t]he primary
and proper function of a trade-mark is to identify the origin or
ownership of the article to which it is affixed."' In 1871 the Court,
in Canal Co. v. Clark,7 had stated that a "trade-mark must either
by itself, or by association, point distinctively to the origin or own-
ership of the article to which it is applied."'7 6 A few years later in
Manufacturing Co. v. Trainer,7 the Court followed Canal Co. and
held that when a mark functions to indicate origin, "It]he symbol
or device .. .becomes a sign to the public of the origin of the
goods to which it is attached, and an assurance that they are the
genuine article of the original producer. 1 8 Thus, trademarks in the
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century functioned as they had in
the middle ages-to denote the physical source of the product.
This "physical source" theory of trademark function was the
basis for protecting the trademark from use by one other than its
owner. 7 As the Supreme Court reasoned in Lawrence Manufactur-
ing Co. v. Tennessee Manufacturing Co.,s0 once a trademark, ei-
72. See supra note 70; see also Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Pat-
ents, 252 U.S. 538, 543 (1920) ("[T]he function of a trade-mark is to point distinctively,
either by its own meaning or by association, to the origin or ownership of the wares to which
it is applied. .. ."); Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916); Hanak,
supra note 34, at 363.
73. 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
74. Id. at 412. This was certainly not a new theory. See Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Thomas
Mfg. Co., 94 F. 651, 656 (C.C.D. Del. 1899) ("The function of a trade-mark is to indicate to
the public the origin, manufacture or ownership of the articles to which it is applied
."); see supra text accompanying notes 25-27; see also Hanak, supra note 34, at 363.
75. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311 (1871).
76. Id. at 323. "The reason of this is that unless it does, neither can he who first
adopted it be injured by any appropriation or imitation of it by others, nor can the public be
deceived." Id.
77. 101 U.S. 51 (1879).
78. Id. at 53.
79. "[T]he common law of trade-marks is but a part of the broader law of unfair com-
petition." Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916); see United Drug
Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300
F. 509 (6th Cir. 1924); Carthage Tobacco Works v. Barlow-Moore Tobacco Co., 296 F. 142
(W.D. Ky. 1924). See generally J. CALIMAFDE, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETTON § 6.01
(1970) (discussing tort of unfair competition).
80. 138 U.S. 537 (1891).
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ther by itself or by association, is a commonly understood refer-
ence to the origin of the article, the manufacturer of the article is
injured whenever another adopts the same name or device for simi-
lar articles.81 The original Lanham Act indirectly preserved this
early view of trademark function. Section 32(1) of the original Act
required that actionable trademark infringement (the statutory
equivalent of unfair competition) be "likely to cause confusion, or
to cause mistake, or to deceive purchasers as to the source of origin
of such goods or services." ' 2 Section 45 of the present Act provides
that "any course of conduct of the registrant" that "causes the
mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin" shall result
in a mark losing the protection of the Act.88 Section 43(a) also im-
plicitly retains the source theory by prohibiting the application of
"a false designation of origin" to any goods moving in interstate
commerce." This section has been interpreted to include both
physical and sponsorship designation of product source.8 5
2. THE SPONSORSHIP FUNCTION
Despite the apparent statutory approval of the origin theory of
trademark function,86 and judicial recognition of the approach in
81. Id. at 546. In Lawrence the plaintiff was unable to show that a quality standard
designation on its products was seen by consumers as a reference to it as a manufacturer
(i.e., the mark did not indicate physical origin to the consumer). Therefore, use of the quali-
ty standard by another company was not actionable. See Columbia Mill v. Alcorn, 150 U.S.
460 (1893).
82. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 32, 60 Stat. 437 (emphasis added). For
a relatively modern application of the original version of this section, see Fleischmann Dis-
tilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1963). In 1962, Congress amended
this section to require only that actionable infringement be "likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive." Act of Oct. 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 17, 76 Stat. 773
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976)). Presumably, this simply broadened the
circumstances that will give rise to an infringement action. See Syntex Laboratories v. Nor-
wich Pharmacal Co., 437 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1971). On the other hand, Congress may have
recognized that "creation and retention of custom, rather than the designation of source, is
the primary purpose of the trademark today .... " Schechter, supra note 19, at 822 (em-
phasis in original). Commentators recognize the continuing confusion as to whether source
or origin of marked goods is the sole test of infringement. See, e.g., J. CALIMADs, supra note
79, § 11.05.
83. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976) (original version at ch. 540, § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946)) (em-
phasis added).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976) (original version at ch. 540, § 43, 60 Stat. 441 (1946)) (em-
phasis added). See generally Taubes, Getting Revenge on Imitations, N.Y. Times, Feb. 28,
1982, § F, at 9 (discussing § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and its modern applications).
85. See Federal-Mogul-Bower Bearings, Inc. v. Azoff, 313 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1963); 1 J.
GILSON, supra note 17, § 1.03[1].
86. Note that only one of the aforementioned sections of the Lanham Act mentions
source in connection with the creation of a mark. The statute deals primarily with source in
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recent infringement cases, 7 the theory has come under heavy at-
tack.8 The requirement that a trademark denote physical origin
was impractical, even in the nineteenth century, and was often ig-
nored. A slow change in judicial approach and substantive changes
in the Lanham Act have turned the emphasis of the origin function
from physical source of production to source of sponsorship.8
In Menendez v. Holt,90 for example, Holt & Co. contested the
use of its trademark "La Favorita" by a competitor. Although the
trademark did not indicate the physical source of the prod-
uct-Holt & Co. did not actually produce or manufacture the flour
upon which it had placed its mark for twenty years-the United
States Supreme Court found that the mark was protected under
common law. The Court held that the trademark evidenced the
"skill, knowledge and judgment" of the company in selecting the
flour,9' and that the mark was "possessed of a merit rendered defi-
nite by [Holt & Co.'s] examination and of a uniformity rendered
certain by their selection."'"
Similarly, in Walter Baker & Co. v. Slack,98 a competitor of
Walter Baker & Co. attempted to sell chocolate under the "Baker"
trademark, "Baker's Chocolate." The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit held that even if the defendant-com-
petitor were to otherwise identify its chocolate as made by another
manufacturer, the marketing of the cocoa under the "Baker" mark
would still constitute unfair competition. The court noted that a
consumer who chooses a product by trademark will generally not
stop to think whether the physical source of two products bearing
identical marks is the same." Thus, simply telling a consumer that
connection with actions affecting established marks and does not directly or indirectly ex-
plain the function of a trademark.
87. See, e.g., Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th
Cir. 1979) ("It is the source-denoting function which trademark laws protect, and nothing
more."); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 515 F. Supp. 448, 452 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (" '[P~rimary significance' is to denote source or producer." (emphasis in original)).
88. See supra notes 16 & 32 and accompanying text.
89. The PTO generally regards source and sponsorship as equivalents. This does not
mean that the PTO requires that an applicant for registration be the producer or manufac-
turer of the goods to which the mark is applied. Ownership of a mark is established by its
use on goods in commerce. Letter from J. David Sams, Member of the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board, to Patricia K. Fletcher (Aug. 18, 1982); see supra text accompanying notes
58-63.
90. 128 U.S. 514 (1888).
91. Id. at 520.
92. Id.
93. 130 F. 514 (7th Cir. 1904).
94. The court stated:
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two items have different physical origins would not prevent the use
of another's trademark from constituting infringement. 5
The tendency to gravitate toward operational realities was
even more apparent in a much later case, E.F. Prichard Co. v. Con-
sumers Brewing Co.9a The United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Cicuit in Prichard stated, "It is sufficient, as regards, the
claim of ownership in the trade-mark, that the goods are manufac-
tured for the claimant, or that they pass through his hands in the
course of trade and that he gives to them the benefits of his name
and business style.'
'97
These cases illustrate the change in the emphasis of the source
theory from physical origin to sponsorship of a marked product. In
the modern marketplace, the consumer neither knows nor cares
whether the owner of a mark is actually making the product, or
whether it is being produced under the owner's supervision or pur-
suant to some other relationship with a third party.' 8 Under the
modified source theory of trademark function-the "sponsorship
theory"-the trademark indicates that the goods to which it is at-
tached emanate from the same maker, or "have reached the con-
sumer through the same channels as certain other goods that have
given the consumer satisfaction" before."9 This sponsorship theory
We may safely take it for granted that not one in a thousand knowing of or
desiring to purchase "Baker's Cocoa" or "Baker's Chocolate" know of Walter
Baker & Co., Limited. The name "Baker" is identified with the product, and
known, in connection with the product of the appellant, as a badge and guaranty
of excellence. To sanction the sale of the spurious article as "Baker's Chocolate"
or "Baker's Cocoa," even if accompanied with the statement that it was manu-
factured by William Henry Baker and not by the old manufacturer, Walter
Baker & Co., Limited, would not inform the purchaser that it was a different
article, or other than the article known to the trade and to the world as "Baker's
Chocolate" and "Baker's Cocoa," and the identity of the name is the more subtle
in the deception.
Id. at 518-19.
95. "This new approach abandoned sole reliance on the source concept in favor of reli-
ance on a theory that a trademark does not always necessarily indicate physical source, but
also indicates quality." 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 18:13(B), at 631-32; see id.
§ 3:4(A), at 92.
96. 136 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1943).
97. Id. at 519.
98. See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 155-56 (9th
Cir. 1963); Hanak, supra note 34, at 364.
99. Schechter, supra note 19, at 816; see Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell
Co., 250 F. 960, 963 (2d Cir. 1918).
Superficially it may appear to be very fine hair-splitting to say that while
the consumer does not know the specific source of a trademarked article, he nev-
ertheless knows that two articles, bearing the same mark, emanate from a single
source. However, the precise distinction is vital in the present connection, for it
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of trademark function clearly replaced the physical source theory
in the twentieth century.
a. The Sponsorship Function and Joint Ownership
While the "sponsorship" theory appears to be more liberal
than its predecessor, judicial interpretation has made it no less re-
strictive. The theory requires that a mark be associated with only
one sponsor. In Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co.,100
the Shredded Wheat Company sought to enjoin the defendant
company from selling any shredded wheat biscuits without dis-
tinctly distinguishing that company's biscuits from its own. In ex-
plaining the plaintiff's right to protection, Judge Learned Hand
wrote:
The plaintiff has at least shown that the public has become ac-
customed to regard its familiar wheat biscuit as emanating, if
not from it by name, at least from a single, though anonymous,
maker, and the second is as good for these purposes as the first.
Though the public may, therefore, buy the biscuit because it has
come to like it, the plaintiff still has a stake in that other motive
for buying; i.e., that it comes from the accustomed maker.101
Accordingly, the buyer is entitled to assume that a trademark
functions to identify, or is somehow linked in some manner with
the source of a product.102
The Patent Office, and later the PTO, continued to impose the
requirement of a single sponsor or source: "The Patent Office ad-
heres to the view that only one registration for the same or a con-
fusingly similar mark should issue, and there is no room under the
Lanham Act for recognizing 'joint ownership' of a mark (other
brings out clearly the creative and not merely symbolic nature of the modern
trademark or tradename.
Schechter, supra note 19, at 817.
100. 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918).
101. Id. at 963 (citation omitted; emphasis added). This case did not involve an affixed
symbol to the goods. Rather, the plaintiff successfully argued that the appearance of its
biscuits had acquired a secondary meaning (based on uniformity and reliability of its origi-
nal source of manufacture) which was entitled to the same protection as a trademark.
Interestingly, the court recognized both the sponsorship and quality functions of trade-
marks in the quoted portion of the Shredded Wheat opinion. Two years later the Supreme
Court appeared to take a more restrictive view of trademark function in Estate of P.D.
Beckwith, Inc. v. Commissioner of Patents, 252 U.S. 538, 543-44 (1920).
102. See 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 70, § 3:3(B), at 92; cf. Lunsford, Trademarks:
Prestige, Practice, and Protection, supra note 1, at 324 (contending that a mark cannot
have two sources and still be a trademark). The sponsorship function theory has no statu-
tory support unless "sponsor" is read as a synonym for "source."
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than by a firm or a partnership) or for plural registration. .. .
Some recent commentators have agreed: "It has been said that a
trademark to be distinctive must, like a woman's hat, be exclusive;
a trademark cannot have two origins any more than a man can
have two mothers." 104 Before 1956, commentators and the Patent
Office assumed that joint ownership of a trademark by more than
one person not a member of a single entity, such as a partnership,
should not be recognized.105 The Patent Office simply did not per-
mit registration in the name of joint owners. ' "
Despite this adverseness to joint ownership of trademarks, a
1933 case allowed such ownership when the registrants applied as
joint applicants. The court in Ex parte Taylor (the Baby's Spray-
Tray case) 107 permitted the joint ownership because "the parties
seeking registration are, under the laws of their state of domocile
[sic], joint owners of the business in the carrying on of which the
goods are manufactured-or their manufacture procured-and
sold, and the mark is used upon and in connection with this jointly
owned business." 1"8 The Baby's Spray-Tray case, however, was to-
tally ignored after enactment of the Lanham Act, and no new cases
permitting joint ownership of a mark appeared until 1956.
In 1956, Assistant Commissioner of Patents Leeds permitted
registration of a trademark by joint applicants in Ex parte Pacific
Intermountain Express Co.10 In that case, the applicants were in-
terstate truck haulers of freight operating under the Interstate
Commerce Commission's route regulations. They entered into a
freight interchange contract under which each transported freight
for the other in their respective service areas. Although each appli-
cant operated solely within a limited geographical area, both appli-
cants had jointly spent thousands of dollars advertising the mark
identifying their services. The Commissioner held that in this con-
text the mark was jointly owned and could be jointly registered
because it was used by the two applicants to identify a single ser-
vice, performed by each independently in separate service areas.
The case was viewed as an exception to an otherwise "inflexible
103. H. TOULMIN, TRADE-MARK HANDBOOK 53 (1957).
104. See, e.g., Lunsford, Consumers and Trademarks, supra note 1, at 78.
105. See Derenberg, The Tenth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark
Act of 1946, 47 TRADE-MARK REP. 879, 897 (1957).
106. See id.
107. 18 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 292 (Comm'r Pats. 1933).
108. Id. at 293.




In retrospect, the "inflexible rule" prohibiting joint ownership
of marks seems contrary to the express provisions of the Lanham
Act. The Act provides that "[tihe owner of a trade-mark used in
commerce may register his trade-mark under [the Act]" ' and,
more importantly, that "[w]ords used in the singular include the
plural and vice versa." ' 2 The implication is that joint owners of a
trademark may register under the statute.
In 1961 the Patent Office appeared to change its policy regard-
ing joint ownership and began accepting jointly executed trade-
mark applications in the name of joint applicants.1 3 One commen-
tator explained that the acceptance of those applications was a
belated adoption of Commissioner Leeds's position in Pacific In-
termountain."" The PTO, however, remains hesitant about grant-
ing joint registation of a mark to other than a firm or
corporation. 1 5
The PTO's present policy is to send an "office action" letter in
response to an application for joint registration inquiring whether
the parties "have not been incorrectly labeled 'joint owners' when
in fact they are members of a partnership or are part of some other
type of business entity in whose name application should be
made." Because of the great expense involved in marketing a
new product and creating a new trademark," 7 and the amount of
time it ordinarily takes to have a trademark registration applica-
110. Derenberg, supra note 105, at 897.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1976) (original version at ch. 540, § 1, 60 Stat. 427 (1946)).
112. Id. § 1127 (original version at ch. 540, § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946)).
113. Derenberg, supra note 10, at 795. Derenberg considered it "a welcome change
since there never was any sound reason why, contrary to patent and copyright law, joint
ownership of trademarks and joint registrations should not be recognized. . . in. . .appro-
priate situations." Id. at 796.
114. Id.
115. Normally a trademark application is filed in the name of one party. Histori-
cally the Office has been reluctant to accept applications by joint applicants be-
cause, superficially at least, ownership by more than one party seems to be con-
trary to the function of a trademark to indicate singleness of commercial source.
TMEP, supra note 9, § 802.03(d), at 34. No cases have construed this language.
116. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 13, pt. 1-A, n.5.
Once an applicant for registration of a trademark has been notified by the Trademark
Examiner of any further action required by the applicant before registration, the applicant
has six months to file a response. 15 U.S.C. § 1062(b) (1976). This procedure is repeated
until final rejection. The Examiner has no discretion to shorten or extend the period. The
response must be received, that is, must be on file, within six months from the date stamped
on the Office Action.
117. See infra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
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tion processed,11 8 the PTO's position on joint application makes it
an economically less desirable method of trademark registration.
Obviously, the stakes must be high to make joint applicant status
worth the expense.
Because of the PTO's position, there has been only one case
subsequent to Pacific Intermountain involving registration of a
jointly owned trademark and the applicable provisions in the
Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure ("TMEP")." 9 In In
re Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc.,"20 the Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board departed from the usual policy and approved the
joint ownership and registration of a trademark. Diamond Walnut
Growers and Sunsweet Growers applied as joint applicants for re-
gistration of a combined trademark. A licensee used the mark in
interstate commerce, and the joint applicants exercised complete
control over the nature and quality of the goods the licensee
sold.12' The Board held that when separate legal entities combine
to perform a specific function or to market the fruit of their com-
bined labors through a joint venture or undertaking, under a mark
created by them to identify the venture, their trademark rights
should be protected through registration. 2"
Diamond Walnut presented a unqiue set of facts and is proba-
bly of little precedential value. The court treated the relationship
between the parties for joint quality control of goods marketed
under a combined trademark as a joint venture. Furthermore, the
case involved an effort to market the fruits of combined labor. Dia-
mond Walnut would not apply if two parties wished to market
goods independently under a mark created for the venture or
under a mark which one of the applicants had previously owned.
3. THE QUALITY OR GUARANTEE FUNCTION
Although trademarks were traditionally viewed as an indicator
of the product's source or origin, there was always some recogni-
tion that marks also guaranteed consistent quality.'" In 1879 the
Supreme Court recognized that a trademark functions as both a
118. See supra text accompanying note 14.
119. In re Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 507 (Trademark Tr.
App. Bd. 1979); see infra text accompanying notes 120-22.
120. 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 507 (Trademark Tr. App. Bd. 1979).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 509-10.
123. See supra text accompanying note 19.
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guarantee of quality and an indicator of source. 124 In Manhattan
Medicine Co. v. Wood, 25 the Court remarked that a "trademark is
both a sign of the quality of the article and an assurance to the
public that it is the genuine product of [the trademark owner's]
manufacture. ' 1 2' This "quality" function did not guarantee the
highest quality, but instead promised consistency among similarly
marked goods.
12 7
Subsequent cases began to juggle the source and quality theo-
ries of the trademark function in an effort to find a balance be-
tween the two. In the 1946 case of Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope
Co., 1"8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
observed that "[a]lthough the primary purpose of a trade-mark is
to indicate the origin, manufacture and ownership of the article in
the mind of the purchasing public, it is usually associated with the
quality of the product which it symbolizes."12' By 1968 the Trade-
mark Trial and Appeal Board acknowledged that
the chief function of a trademark is a kind of "warranty" to pur-
chasers that they will receive, when they purchase goods bearing
the mark, goods of the same character and source, anonymous as
it may be, as other goods previously purchased bearing the mark
that have already given the purchaser satisfaction.8 0
Thus the courts gradually recognized the trademark's primary role
as an indicator of constant quality; its secondary role being an in-
124. Every one is at liberty to affix to a product of his own manufacture any
symbol or device, not previously appropriated, which will distinguish it from ar-
ticles of the same general nature manufactured or sold by others, and thus se-
cure to himself the benefits of increased sale by reason of any peculiar excellence
he may have given to it. The symbol or device thus becomes a sign to the public
of the origin of the goods to which it is attached, and an assurance that they are
the genuine article of the original producer.
Manufacturing Co. v. Trainer, 101 U.S. 51, 53 (1879).
125. 108 U.S. 218 (1883).
126. Id. at 222-23.
127. The quality function of the trademark has its historical roots in the Industrial
Revolution. The consumer and the retail supplier both became heavily dependent on brand
names, which became "symbols of quality and guarantees of satisfaction." Schechter, supra
note 19, at 824.
128. 155 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1946).
129. Id. at 571-72.
130. Revlon, Inc. v. La Maur, Inc., 157 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 602, 605 (Trademark Tr. App.
Bd. 1968). The Soviet Union introduced compulsory trademarks in the 1960's to assign re-
sponsibility for inferior products. Diamond, The Next 100 Years-What Will It Be Like in
2078 AD?, 68 TRADE-MARK Ral. 622, 624 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Diamond, The Next
100 Years].
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dicator of the source or sponsorship of a product."1
Several recent cases imposing product liability on a trademark
licensor for goods that were produced by a licensee illustrate the
significance of the modern view that trademarks function as sym-
bols of responsibility. In Gizzi v. Texaco, Inc.,3 2 an action was
brought against Texaco, which had urged consumer reliance on
Texaco service station employees by use of the slogan, "Trust your
car to the man who wears the star." A Texaco station operator sold
a used car with repaired brakes to the plaintiff, who was later in-
jured when the brakes failed. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that the evidence created a question of
fact for the jury as to whether the station operator had apparent
authority as Texaco's agent because he wore the company's "star"
trademark." '
In Drexel v. Union Prescription Centers, 4 the issue was
whether a franchisor could be held vicariously liable for the negli-
gence of its franchisee. The franchise agreement required the fran-
chisee to identify itself as the owner of the store in conjunction
with the use of the franchisor's mark and logo.133 Once again a
trademark served as the basis of a complaint arguing consumer re-
liance on the apparent authority of a franchisee arising from trade-
mark use. " '
Similarly, in the 1979 case of Koosters v. Seven-Up Co.,1 3 7 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that a
"franchisor's sponsorship, management and control of the system
for distributing 7-Up, plus its specific consent" to the use of the
soft drink's carrying carton, placed the "franchisor in the position
of a supplier of the product for purposes of tort liability." 8 Ac-
131. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir.
1979). See generally Hanak, supra note 34 (discussing the quality assurance function of
trademarks).
Of course, a trademark can be either advantageous or ruinous. The quality function
need not be governmentally regulated because a mark not associated with a particular value
is worthless. Cf. Hanak, supra, note 34, at 373 ("Despite broad authority, the Federal Trade
Commission has rarely concerned itself with forcing trademark owners to assure that their
marks indicate a certain level of quality or uniformity.").
132. 437 F.2d 308 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 829 (1971).
133. Id. at 310.
134. 582 F.2d 781 (3d Cir. 1978).
135. Id. at 794-96.
136. Id. at 783. The court did not decide this case on the merits, but reversed a grant of
summary judgment for the defendant. Id. at 797.
137. 595 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1979).
138. Id. at 353.
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cordingly, the Seven-Up Company was held liable to a purchaser of
a carton of the soft drink who was injured when a bottle slipped
from the carton and exploded. The only control the Seven-Up
Company had over the carton related to the use of its trademark
on the carton, for the company had neither manufactured nor sup-
plied it. 5' The Koosters, Drexel, and Texaco decisions recognize
the quality function that the trademark performs in relation to the
consumer. 140 In all three cases the only connection between the
purchaser and the trademark owner was the guarantee of quality
as provided by the trademark.
The Lanham Act, in its provisions dealing with related compa-
nies, indirectly affirms the guarantee or quality assurance function
of trademarks.1 41 The Act defines related company as "any person
who legitimately controls or is controlled by the registrant or ap-
plicant for registration in respect to the nature and quality of the
goods or services in connection with which the mark is used.
'1 42
Under the Act the related company's use of the registrant's trade-
mark inures to the benefit of the registrant because the mark em-
ployed is exactly the same mark owned and registered by the
licensor.
1 48
This statutory and judicial recognition of the quality function
of trademarks fills a legitimate need of the modem commercial
community. A trademark owner may wish to expand, but may not
wish to manage each aspect of the enlarged business. 44 By licens-
ing his mark, the trademark owner increases the recognition of his
mark, expands his market, and at the same time obtains additional
royalties without having to perform additional operations. The li-
censee acquires the use of a mark "known to the public which al-
139. Id. at 350.
140. See also supra text accompanying notes 15-16.
141. Cf. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 3:4(A) ("Passage of the Lanham Act of 1946
firmly established the quality function of trademarks as a rule of law.").
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976) (original version at ch. 540, § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946))
(emphasis added).
143. Section 1055 provides:
Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be registered is or may be used
legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to the benefit of the reg-
istrant or applicant for registration, and such use shall not affect the validity of
such mark or of its registration, provided such mark is not used in such manner
as to deceive the public.
15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976) (original version at ch. 540, § 5, 60 Stat. 429 (1946)).
144. The licensor may still be held liable for all aspects of the business. See, e.g., supra
text accompanying notes 132-40.
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ready generates considerable consumer demand."' 4
Under the strict physical source theory of trademark function,
this type of licensing of a mark for another's use was impossible
because courts viewed the consumer's ability to associate a trade-
marked product with its actual source as a critical element of a
trademark function." 6 Modern franchising and licensing would be
considerably limited under the strict source theory because fran-
chisees and licensees could not sell products and services which did
not actually originate with the trademark owner. " 7 Under the Lan-
ham Act and the more liberal sponsorship theory, however, the
trademark function of indicating source is subordinated to the
function of giving the consumer assurance that articles bearing the
same mark will be of similar quality.'"
The Act clearly requires that a trademark licensor exercise
control over both the quality and nature of the goods produced by
his licensees to qualify for federal registration.' 4 9 Without this re-
quirement, "the right of a trademark owner to license his mark
separately from the business in connection with which it has been
used would create the danger that products bearing the same
trademark might be of diverse qualities.""50 The Act imposes an
affirmative duty on the trademark licensor to guarantee consistent
quality, allowing a business practice which directly contravenes the
strict source theory of trademark function."'1
Some courts and commentators have concluded, because of
the increasing importance of the quality function, that the source
theory is no longer viable, thereby ignoring the trademark's impor-
tance to its owner. 15" But if quality was the sole trademark func-
tion, then an owner would have no basis to complain if a competi-
tor sold the same product under the same mark. A manufacturer,
145. Comment, Trademark Licensing: The Problem of Adequate Control, 1968 DuKE
L.J. 875, 876 n.3.
146. See Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 620 (1879).
147. See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 70, § 3:3(A).
148. See Thomas Pride Mills, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 155 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 205, 208 (N.D.
Ga. 1967) (a primary function of a trademark is to offer this assurance to the ultimate
consumer).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1976) (original version at ch. 540, § 5, 60 Stat. 429 (1946)).
150. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, 267 F.2d 358, 367 (2d Cir. 1959).
151. See generally A. SEIDEL, WHAT THE GENERAL PRACTITIONER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS 117-18 (4th ed. 1979) (general discussion of type of control
necessary).
152. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text; see also Lunsford, Consumers and




of course, realizes that the sale of an identical product deceives the
consumer because it presents confusion as to "source," "origin," or
"sponsorship." ''5 A trademark must function to indicate both the
sponsorship identification and quality assurance functions for a
mark to have any value to its owner.1 "
4. THE ADVERTISING FUNCTION
Beyond its "sponsorship" and "quality" functions, a trade-
mark has evolved into an advertising medium. Although medieval
regulatory marks simply served a police function, the modern
trademark represents to consumers the desirability of the com-
modity on which it appears: the consumer's approval contributes
to the manufacturer's goodwill. " Thus, "[t]he mark actually sells
the goods."" 6'
It has been suggested that the function of a trademark is to
act as a "commercial magnet."1' 67 Although the "quality" function
may be of primary significance to the consumer, the modern manu-
facturer and seller rely heavily on a trademark's inherent com-
mercial promotional value.'"s Justice Frankfurter, in Mishawaka
Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co.,159 per-
153. See A. Bourjois & Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1922). In Bourjois a foreign manu-
facturer of face powder sold to the plaintiff its business and goodwill in the United States,
together with its trademarks registered under the Trade-Mark Act of 1905. The plaintiff re-
registered the marks, continued to import the powder and went on with the business. The
Court found that the defendant's sale in the United States of the same powder also im-
ported from France was actionable infringement.
154. Although there is no direct government enforcement concerning the quality func-
tion of trademarks outside the "related company" area, an owner's failure to maintain con-
sistent quality in marked products may have legal consequences. For example, "a trademark
owner who deceives the public by debasing the quality of the product for which his trade-
mark stands may be barred by unclean hands from maintaining an action for infringement."
Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on
other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
155. See Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 301 (9th Cir.
1979).
156. Schechter, supra note 19, at 819 (emphasis in original).
157. See Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Sym-
bols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1189 (1948); Carson, supra note 51, at 66.
158. See Address by Alfred T. Lee, Forum on Trademarks in Advertising and Selling,
sponsored by the United States Trademark Association (Mar. 16, 1966), printed in TRADE-
MARKS IN ADVERTISING AND SELLING 1 (1966). In 1966 the United States Trademark Associa-
tion estimated that approximately 98% of all advertising was directed to the selling of prod-
ucts and services carrying trademarks. Opehing Remarks by Cyril F. Hetsko, Forum on
Trademarks in Advertising and Selling, sponsored by the United States Trademark Associa-
tion (Mar. 16, 1966), printed in Introduction to TRADEMARKS IN ADVERTISING AND SELLING at
viii (1966). Current statistics are not yet available.
159. 316 U.S. 203 (1942).
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ceptively commented,
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the
psychological function of symbols. If it is true that we live by
symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A
trade-mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a pur-
chaser to select what he wants, or what he has been led to be-
lieve he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human pro-
pensity by making every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of
the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol.
Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same-to convey
through the mark, in the minds of potential customers, the de-
sirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this is
attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value.60
Although Mishawaka was decided in 1942, Justice Frankfurter ap-
pears to have foreseen the modern commercial environment in
which trademarks are used. According to a recent survey of
selected firms from the Fortune 500 list, for example, eighty-nine
percent of companies selling consumer products use consumer re-
search in selecting a trademark." '
A trademark's advertising function is intrinsically tied to its
"quality" and "sponsorship" functions. A trademarked product
that does not represent a desirable and consistent quality to the
consumer will have no advertising value to the manufacturer. Like-
wise, although the trademark may not consciously represent the
source or the sponsorship of the marked product to the consumer,
the sponsorship function is indispensable to the operation of the
advertising function. If the customer does not know that products
bearing the same mark are produced by the same party, a trade-
mark cannot possibly function as a promise of consistent quality. A
trademark that promises high and consistent quality will necessa-
rily act as a commercial magnet. Although the functions of a trade-
mark are intertwined, all are dependent to some degree on the
mark's sponsorship function. A trademark must communicate ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly that some entity or group is responsible
for all items sold under the mark. Although it appears clear that a
trademark may serve a variety of mutually dependent functions,
the question remains whether protection of any or all of these
functions through a federal trademark system is itself of value to
160. Id. at 205.
161. McNeal & Zeren, Brand Name Selection for Consumer Products, MSU Bus. Top-
ics, Spring 1981, at 35, 35. The researchers sent questionnaires to 200 firms that primarily
manufacture consumer products. Ninety-seven responses were received.
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the mark owner and public.
IV. THE FUNCTION AND VALUE OF THE TRADEMARK SYSTEM
A. A Trademark System Promotes Competition
Protection of property rights in the trademark system is
founded on entirely different legal theories from either the patent
or copyright system.1"e Patents and copyrights are government
grants and the United States Constitution limits the length of the
grant and the associated right to exclusive use. 168 Once the period
of the grant for a patent or copyright expires, the right to exclusive
use expires.' e4 A properly protected trademark, on the other hand,
"can last forever."1 " Furthermore, unlike patents and copyrights, a
trademark "confers no protection against imitators of the product
itself. 16 6 Trademark law, in protecting the names and symbols
identifying the seiier's product, protects the goodwill associated
with the product rather than the product itself.
That the property right in the trademark is unquestionably
"exclusive and absolute 1 6 7 has led some commentators to conclude
that trademarks are monopolistic.1"e If a trademark is a monopoly
to any degree, it is only in the limited sense that an owner of the
mark can prevent another supplier from affixing the same or simi-
lar mark to similar goods. It is questionable, however, whether a
trademark system can ever be deemed monopolistic. A trademark
is valueless without consumer demand for the marked product. 
e
6
162. See generally S. DIAMOND, TRADEMARK PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at 241-42 (com-
paring copyrights, patents, and trademarks).
163. The congressional power to regulate the respective rights is based on two distinct
constitutional powers. The power to grant patents and copyrights is specifically provided by
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The power to regulate trademarks, in contrast, is based on a
gloss of the commerce clause of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
164. See Lunsford, Trademarks: Prestige, Practice, and Protection, supra note 1, at
325-26.
165. Trademarks: The Other Mess, supra note 7, at 45 (quoting Dorothy Fey, Execu-
tive Director of the United States Trademark Association). "R & H's Plexiglas mark, for
example, dates to 1936 .... Dutch Boy, now part of Sherwin-Williams, goes back to 1907,
Sherwin-Williams's 'Cover the Earth' design and slogan, to 1905. And the 'Arm & Hammer'
mark of Church & Dwight is even older-it was first used in 1878." Id.
166. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 277
(1977).
167. F. UPTON, supra note 33, at 10. "It has been often said, that the doctrine of exclu-
sive property in trade-marks, has prevailed from the time of the Year Books." Id.; see supra
notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Papandreou, The Economic Effect of Trademarks, 44 CALiv. L. REv. 503
(1956).
169. "No amount of advertising can sustain a product that doesn't meet the needs of
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As the United States Supreme Court noted in United Drug Co. v.
Theodore Rectanus Co.:170 "In truth, a trade-mark confers no mo-
nopoly whatever in a proper sense, but is merely a convenient
means for facilitating the protection of one's good-will in trade by
placing a distinguishing mark or symbol-a commercial signa-
ture-upon the merchandise or the package in which it is sold.''
In a recent federal case, Standard Oil Co. (Kentucky) v. Humble
Oil & Refining Co., 7 2 the court stated the rule more simply:
"[T]here is not now, nor has there ever been, a conflict between
the antitrust laws and trademark laws or the law of unfair compe-
tition.' 78 Trademarks are intrinsic to the nonmonopolistic move-
ment of goods in a free enterprise market.'7 4
Federally regulated registration makes effective competition
possible by enabling consumers to choose goods based on their in-
dividual merit. 7 5 Trademarks do not prevent a competitor from
"honorable competition in trade.' 6 "The striking feature of a
trademark . . . is that it is used to distinguish between goods or
services that normally are supplied by several business competi-
tors. '7 7 Thus, it is only when two or more producers are compet-
ing for public favor that there is a need for trademarks at all. 7 8
Without some method of product identification, meaningful
competition among quality products would be substantially ham-
pered. With anonymity, "reverse" competition would control.1
7 It
would be cheaper and more profitable to produce the lowest possi-
consumers." Uihlein, Logos and Initials as Marketing Tools, ADVERTISING AGE, Mar. 17,
1980, at S-22, S-22.
170. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
171. Id. at 98.
172. 363 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967).
173. Id. at 954.
174. See S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 48, at 3; Rogers, supra note 24, at 177.
175. See Standard Oil Co. (Ky.) v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 363 F.2d 945, 954 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1007 (1967).
In 1860 Francis Upton came to the same conclusion:
As the true interests of manufacturers and commerce have been more per-
fectly developed, . . . it has been found, that an exclusive property in trade
marks, and its adequate protection by Courts of Equity, not only imposes no
restraint upon the freedom of trade, but that its direct and inevitable tendency
is, to promote and encourage that laudable competition, in which lies the true
interest of the public ....
F. UPtON, supra note 33, at 13.
176. Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 94 F. 651, 657 (C.C.D. Del. 1899).
177. S. DIAMOND, TRADEMARK PROBLEMS, supra note 21, at 2.
178. See Rogers, supra note 24, at 176-77.




ble quality product because the consumer would not be able to dif-
ferentiate between products or retaliate against any supplier by
avoiding his product. The introduction of "unbranded," "brand-
less," "generic," and "no-name" products has demonstrated that it
is more profitable to produce lower quality goods without trade-
marks. Price reductions associated with these products are not pri-
marily achieved by eliminating the expense of promotions and ad-
vertising. Instead, as an officer of one corporation that began
marketing no-name, generic products has stated: "Labeling is the
smaller portion of the saving. The product is the greater."180
Comparative advertising is fostered by trademarks. A manu-
facturer may use a competitor's trademark in an advertisement
comparing their products. 8 ' Through such comparative advertis-
ing, a successful product marketed under a known trademark acts
as an incentive within the industry to introduce similar or im-
proved products uider a competing mark.
B. The Economic Role of Trademarks
The question remains whether our present trademark system
is efficient. It might be argued that under a theoretical economic
model of a free enterprise system in which all goods offered for sale
are interchangeable, an economic system in which trademarks had
no place would serve the public equally well. As Sidney Diamond,
the former Commissioner of Patents, has maintained,82 the classi-
cal economic model of a free enterprise system is no longer entirely
applicable to a modern industrial system. The modern model
would be one in which all interested parties could maximize their
self-interest most efficiently and at the least cost to society.183 Al-
though not perfect, a system that protects trademarks best effects
such a goal.
The value of trademarks to both consumers and owners is an
incentive to their creation, preservation, and exclusive ownership.
180. Gray, Farmer Jack Joins No-name Marketers, ADVERTISING AGE, Apr. 17, 1978, at
3, 3 (quoting Harry Cogan, Vice-President of Grocery Procurement for the Borman's Inc.
unit). Savings are a result of the use of extra-standard and standard grades rather than
fancy. Id.; accord Diamond, Historical Development, supra note 23, at 289. But see Dia-
mond, The Next 100 Years, supra note 130, at 623 ("no-names" are themselves
trademarks).
181. See Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 569 (9th Cir. 1968) (perfume manufac-
turer permitted to advertise its perfume as being duplicative of another trademarked
perfume).
182. Diamond, Public Interest, supra note 30, at 535.
183. See R. PosNER, EcONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 3 (2d ed. 1977).
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Trademarks will not be employed efficiently absent exclusive own-
ership, if they are employed at all. The result applies to all stages
of the investment process. If any firm could market its product
under any brand name, a mark owner could neither build on the
goodwill obtained by his first use, nor determine the efficient level
of quality or consumer desire. In contrast, a trademark owner with
guaranteed exclusive use of his mark is motivated to exploit the
most efficient means of technological and market enhancement of
goods sold under the mark.184
The trademark system induces the mark owner to invest to
maximize the value of his mark without fear that the fruits of the
investment will be appropriated by competitors. The development
of a successful trademark often requires substantial investments;
an expenditure that otherwise would not be undertaken. For exam-
ple, it cost the world's largest oil company $100 million to change
its name to "Exxon." 185 The costs of developing a new mark are a
major cost of doing business. Launching a new brand nationwide
now costs at least thirty million dollars in advertising.18 Further-
more, just one in ten items introduced survives.
Investment in a trademark is highly specific to the brand
name. 18 "Not only would [a] firm not invest in this specific asset
[without trademark protection], but there would be an incentive
for the firm to depreciate a valuable rented brand name."1ss Thus,
identification in the form of trademarks encourages manufacturer
responsibility and promotes the development of a better product.
A protected property right in a mark allows the manufacturer to
"notify the public of the origin of the article and secure to himself
the benefits of any particular excellence it may possess from the
184. Richard Posner, in his Economic Analysis of Law, has noted that "the legal pro-
tection of property rights has the important economic function of creating incentives to use
resources efficiently." R. POSNER, supra note 183, at 28.
185. It had previously operated under five names. Enis, Exxon Marks the Spot, J. AD-
VERTISING RESEARCH, Dec. 1978, at 7, 7. Color, letter, style, and other qualities of the trade-
mark were all extensively tested for consumer acceptance in countries all over the world. Id.;
see Carson, supra note 51, at 67; see also supra note 161 and accompanying text.
186. Name Game, New Wine in Old Bottles, TIME, Aug. 31, 1981, at 41, 41. Brand
extension, the use of established brand names on new products, is a strategy to avoid such
costs. "It's a method for a company to enter a new business through the leverage of its most
valuable asset-the consumer awareness, good will and impressions conveyed by its brand
name." Id. (quoting Edward Tauber, a University of Southern California marketing profes-
sor) (emphasis added).
187. See Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the




manner or materials of its manufacture." 18 To consumers, on the
other hand, a brand name allows choice, promises consistent quali-
ty, simplifies shopping and, to a certain extent, allows self-expres-
sion.190 The value a consumer attaches to a trademark may be fun-
damental to the value the consumer attaches to the product itself.
For example, Murjani, a clothing manufacturer, eliminated the
swan logo from Gloria Vanderbilt pants to cut costs. Vehement
consumer complaints convinced Murjani that the logo should be
reapplied and the pants reflected the added cost.'
Nationwide advertising attempts to create this type of con-
sumer recognition to attract trade and sell products.'" Without
this right to advertise and display trademarks, the mark would be
of no value to its owner and the products possibly of less value to
the consumer. Moreover, without trademark protection and adver-
tising of brand names, there would be no free press, radio, or tele-
vision.'" These media forms are dependent on the advertising
spent to promote trademarked products and services.
A trademark system that preserves trademarks as source iden-
tifiers leads to economies of scale and lowers prices. If a trademark
did not communicate source, advertising would be valueless. Ad-
vertising funnels demand to trademarked products and increases
sales. Increased consumption of goods requires larger production
facilities, which in turn leads to price reductions, not price
increases. 9'"
This is not to say that the use of a mark in advertising should
be exclusive, nor that comparative advertising should be banned.1"
So long as it is clear that the product compared is not sponsored
by the advertiser, the source function of the trademark is not di-
189. Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 222 (1883).
190. See id.; McNeal & Zeren, supra note 161, at 35.
191. Uihlein, supra note 169, at S-22.
192. "Campbell Soup estimates that the average shopper views its red-and-white soup
cans in supermarkets 76 times a year. That's double the number of times a consumer sees
the product in TV ads, making the well-known package equivalent in value to more than
$26 million in advertising." Abrams, Marketing, Wall St. J., May 20, 1982, at 29, col. 1.
193. Lunsford, Trademarks: Prestige, Practice, and Protection, supra note 1, at 324-25.
194. This is not to say that trademark rights cannot be abused. Current law adequately
deals with such abuses, however, without destroying the trademark system itself. A proper
injunction can prevent almost any undesirable conduct. Although compulsory trademark
licensing has been advocated recently, preservation of the sponsorship function of trade-
marks makes this an entirely inappropriate solution to any illegal behavior. See generally
Holmes, Compulsory Patent and Trademark Licensing: A Framework for Analysis, 12 Lov.
U. CH. L.J. 43 (1980).
195. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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minished and competition is encouraged by such advertising. Addi-
tionally, comparative advertising fosters product improvement, en-
suring that a trademark remains a symbol of quality.
Trademark registration is also economically valuable because
it reduces duplicative investment. Once a trademark is registered,
other firms can learn of its appropriation before investing in the
same mark. A PTO trademark search, conducted by an indepen-
dent searching firm, lawyer, or other qualified persons, efficiently
places the costs of this protection on those benefiting from it.
Federal registration gives trademark owners an affirmative in-
centive to seek out other firms to exploit its investment in a mark.
The most efficient and value-optimizing method to realize a return
on an investment in a trademark is to license it.' e" The owner of
the mark can augment the goodwill associated with his mark
through greater exposure and increased consumer demand. An
added benefit of licensing under the Lanham Act is that the stat-
ute creates a defined set of legal rights known to the parties at the
outset of any negotiations. This reduces negotiation costs for the
contracting parties.
The licensing of trademarks cogently demonstrates the value
of a system that preserves marks. Extensive government regulation
is unnecessary because the system promotes individual enforce-
ment of the law, thereby indirectly preserving the "guarantee"
function of trademarks. Because both the licensor and licensee
know a mark is of no value without its associated goodwill, the
self-interest of the parties effectively guarantees the preservation
of the value of the mark. In other words, both the licensor and the
licensee will look for and prosecute trademark infringement to pre-
serve their investment. Because the burden of the Act's enforce-
ment is on the parties closest to the transaction, the system is cost
efficient. The "Coca-Cola" and "Coke" trademarks best illustrate
that the potential or actual value of a trademark ensures such
"self-policing" when a mark is licensed. It has been suggested that
if all the plants and inventories of the Coca-Cola Company should
go up in smoke overnight, the company could acquire funds to re-
build by using the inherent goodwill in the marks alone as secur-
ity.197 The licensor and licensees of the marks have a tremendously
valuable (and profitable) interest in the two marks which must be
196. See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "control"
requirement in licensing.
197. Lunsford, Trademarks: Prestige, Practice, and Protection, supra note 1, at 339.
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"self-protected" as a matter of economic survival.
The trademark system protects the consumer from fraud.
Fraud is a problem in consumer transactions because the con-
sumer's stake is small, making it difficult to devise effective legal
remedies."' Unmasking product misrepresentation would be tre-
mendously expensive. One economic justification for the trade-
mark system is that it deters and prevents fraudulent behavior by
creating private. rights of actions in owners, but not in consum-
ers.'"9 When a competitor affixes another's mark to his product,
the loss to the individual consumer is relatively small: the reduced
value of the toothbrush, shaving cream, or soft drink. Because the
purchaser's economic interest is miniscule, he will not generally be
motivated to discover the source of his dissatisfaction, and will
simply switch brands if one fails to please him. The consumer may
not, however, perceive the misrepresentation or lower quality, and
may continue paying for what he is not receiving. The combined
loss to the public may be tremendous although separate consumer
losses are insignificant. On the other hand, infringement may re-
sult in tremendous losses to the individual mark owner. The adop-
tion and use of a similar mark by a competitor diverts the profit,
goodwill, and value associated with the mark and deprives the
owner of his investment. 00 Because the mark owner's stakes are
great, he has an incentive to expose false claims to the consumer,
especially if a competing firm is gaining sales by falsely marking its
product.' For example, it is estimated that the Coca-Cola Com-
pany spends approximately $10 million each year just sending in-
vestigators into the marketplace "to spirit samples back to the
lab-to make sure that when a customer orders a rum-and-coke,
he gets just that and not a rum-and-something else.'' °0 Rohm and
Haas recently spent $35,000 to investigate dealer substitution of
other plastic sheets for the company's "Plexiglas" brand. As the
firm's associate general counsel explained: "Plexiglas sheet is far
198. R. POSNER, supra note 183, at 81.
199. See id.
200. As a general principle, it may be said that the price-cutting of any trade-
marked article injures the goodwill of the trademark because it conveys an im-
plication unfavorable to the reputation of the article. The customer may ques-
tion the honesty of the trademark owner if the public is able to buy an article of
equal quality at different prices; or that, following a well-known quirk of con-
sumer psychology, the article is less valuable if it is less expensive.
1 R. CALLMANN, supra note 26, § 24.2(c), at 843.
201. See R. POSNER, supra note 183, at 81.
202. Trademarks: The Other Mess, supra note 7, at 45.
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and away our most important trademark, and it is of tremendous
value to our company to promote sales of this product. We don't
want to risk any erosion of that right. 2 03 These expenditures in
company trademark protection reflect the owners' opinion of the
worth of trademarks.
The owner's interest is protected not only by his own actions,
but also by both common-law and statutory trademark remedies
designed to protect the public as well. A complaint based on the
tort of unfair competition, for example, must allege that consumer
deception, mistake, or confusion is probable as a result of confu-
sion about source traceable to a defendant's dishonest marketing
tactics.2" The deception is founded on interference with consumer
choice. Similarly, the consumer is an unnamed third party in every
trademark infringement case under the Lanham Act, although no
consumer is granted standing to sue under that statute.20 As with
the common-law tort, the mark registrant must demonstrate that
the infringer's acts resulted in consumer confusion, mistake, or de-
ceit.2 " Thus, the trademark owner protects the consumer from de-
ception and simultaneously guards his own pecuniary interests.
That the system permits only the owner to bring suit, barring nu-
merous small consumer suits whose costs would be great, is both
efficient and ultimately protective of consumers. The consumers'
interest could never be protected adequately by individual con-
sumer suits because the opposition would invariably have compar-
atively greater funds available for its defense. By encouraging the
parties with the highest stakes in mark preservation to police the
203. They Say There's No Substitute for a Brand Name, CHE.MICA WEEK, Aug. 15,
1979, at 45, 45-46.
204. See J. CALIMAFDE, supra note 79, § 6.20.
205. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976) (original version at ch. 540, § 32, 60 Stat. 437 (1946)).
Section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976), forbids false designations of original
and false descriptions, and affords a civil action to "any person doing business in the local-
ity." Judicial interpretation has restricted the remedy's use to persons doing business in
interstate commerce, excluding consumers. See Colligan v. Activities Club, Ltd., 442 F.2d
686 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Florida ex rel. Broward County v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 329 F. Supp. 364 (S.D. Fla. 1971). See generally Taubes, supra note 84, at 91-99
("The issues remain murky."). As with an infringement action, however, a showing of con-
sumer deception is still an integral part of damage recovery under § 43. See Hesmer Foods,
Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir.) ("To establish a right to damages,
actual deception must be shown. To obtain equitable relief, only a likelihood of consumer
deception need be shown."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 839 (1965). See generally Mulcahy, Sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Its Development and Potential, 3 Loy. U. CH. L.J. 327, 343
(1972); 72 COLUM. L. REV. 182, 190 (1972).
206. 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976). Proof of damages (loss of goodwill or sales) would be
impossible absent such a showing.
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market and instigate suits, the system protects the greatest num-
ber of individuals at the least cost to society.
1. THE ECONOMIC ROLE OF TRADEMARKS AND JOINT OWNERSHIP
In disregarding the economic value of joint ownership of
marks, the PTO relies heavily on a theory of trademark function
developed in the late nineteenth century. The theory that trade-
marks function to denote physical origin ignores the great dis-
tances that separate the modern consumer and trademark owner.
No one expects that all goods bearing the same mark are manufac-
tured or grown in the same location. Rather, a mark communicates
quality by indicating sponsorship of an item.
Generally, when two or more individuals jointly own a mark,
more than one source of marked goods arises. It is a misconcep-
tion, however, that this disturbs the efficiency of our trademark
system or is against public policy. All one need do is recall the
modern theory of trademark function as it has emerged from cases
such as Menendez v. Holt 07 and as it was applied in E.F. Prichard
Co. v. Consumers Brewing Co. 208 The court in Prichard held that
there is no reason to deny a mark owner protection simply because
the goods he sells were neither from one geographical source nor
produced by one person. 20' Instead, trademark protection depends
on the method in which marks are employed because the mark
owners use the marks to convey consistent quality or particular
business styles.
Of course, parties may incorporate or form some other juristic
person to avoid restrictive statutes, regulations, and case law. If a
single sponsor of a mark is unnecessary to the successful function
of a mark, however, PTO policy is inefficient because it raises costs
of doing business. Our present system already employs self-interest
to create an environment in which mark owners police the market
to prevent deceptive marketing through trademark infringement.
The self-interest of mark owners is equally present in joint owner-
ship situations. Joint owners have the same incentive as any other
mark owner to ensure that their jointly owned mark promises con-
sistent quality. If by chance this incentive is absent, the jointly
owned mark will be valueless and therefore incapable of deceiving
consumers. The system has built-in safeguards to prevent the mis-
207. 128 U.S. 514 (1888); see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
208. 136 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1943); see supra note 96 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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use of trademarks.
Joint ownership of trademarks offers an economically efficient
means of identifying goods. The cost of inhibiting joint ownership
offers no countervailing benefits. The arbitrary policy of the PTO
regarding joint applicants is economically wasteful, an anomaly in
an otherwise efficient trademark system. The expense of delay and
counsel involved in joint applicant registration is ultimately passed
to the consumer through increased costs of marked goods. The cost
of restricting joint ownership of trademarks is also passed on to
the consumer in the form of federal income taxes that fund the
PTO's activities discouraging joint ownership. The PTO should re-
consider its policy and concentrate its efforts on promoting that
cornerstone of the modern marketplace: the protected trademark.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO JOINT APPLICANT STATUS
A consensus exists that a trademark may be owned by an indi-
vidual, firm, corporation, association, or any other juristic per-
son.'10 The TMEP clearly provides for joint registration of trade-
marks by joint ventures,"'1 and clearly treats these applications
more favorably than joint applications.2'1 In deciding whether an
entity is a joint venture, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
has quoted Black's Law Dictionary:
a "joint adventure" is, inter alia, "a commercial or maritime en-
terprise undertaken by several persons jointly; a limited part-
nership, not limited in the statutory sense as to the liabilities of
the partners, but as to its scope and direction," and "[a]n associ-
ation of two or more persons to carry out a single business enter-
prise for profit for which purpose they combine their property,
money, efforts, skill and knowledge."' 1'
The Board itself defined a joint venture for the purposes of trade-
mark registration as "an undertaking or 'adventure' in which sepa-
210. Section 45 of the Lanham Act provides the following definition of a natural or
juristic person:
The term "person" and any other word or term used to designate the appli-
cant ... under the provisions of this chapter includes a juristic person as well as
a natural person. The term "juristic person" includes a firm, corporation, union,
association, or other organization capable of suing and being sued in a court of
law.
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976) (original version at ch. 540, § 45, 60 Stat. 443 (1946)).
211. See TMEP, supra note 9, §§ 802.01; .02(b), .03(b), .03(d).
212. Id. § 802.03(d).
213. In re Hercofina, 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 777, 779 (Trademark Tr. App. Bd. 1980)
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 753 (rev. 5th ed. 1979)).
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rate legal entities combine to perform a specific function or to mar-
ket the fruit of their combined labors under a mark created by
them jointly to identify this venture."'
In In re Hercofina,'1 the only trademark case dealing with
joint venture applicants, the panel found that two separate and in-
dependent corporations had formed a joint venture. The parties
had entered into a "Joint Venture Agreement" which provided, in-
ter alia, for officials of the venture and distribution of authority
within the enterprise. The panel noted as significant that the
agreement contemplated that the venture could sue and be sued
within a court of law and held that, absent evidence to the con-
trary, the venture was a juristic person, eligible to apply for regis-
tration. Although the parties in Hercofina set up the venture as a
business organization with a supervising board of managers, the
panel stated that there is no statutory restriction on the venturers
(as separate legal entities) conducting business operations under
their own identities.'1
It appears that Hercofina allows certain applicants to avoid
the problems associated with joint applicant status by simply ap-
plying as joint venturers. The only restrictions are that the mark
be created by the parties jointly and that the applicants intend to
market the product through their combined labors.1 7 Joint ven-
ture status, however, will not aid two independent parties who
wish to jointly register a mark previously owned by either party or
purchased from a third party."'
214. Id. at 781; cf. In re Diamond Walnut Growers, Inc., 204 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 507, 510
(Trademark Tr. App. Bd. 1979) (although action urged joint applicant status, the court's
language and justification of registration appears, in retrospect, applicable to a joint venture
application).
215. 207 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 777 (Trademark Tr. App. Bd. 1980).
216. Id. at 781.
217. See supra text accompanying note 214.
In non-trademark cases, the common-law definitions of joint venture appear narrower
than that of the Hercofina panel. For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit has held that a joint venture "exists when two or more persons combine in a
joint business enterprise for their mutual benefit, with an ... agreement that they are to
share in the profits or losses of the enterprise, and that each is to have a voice in its control
and management." Chisholm v. Gilmer, 81 F.2d 120, 124 (4th Cir.), af'd, 299 U.S. 99 (1936);
see DeWitt v. Sorenson, 288 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1961).
Gladys Glickman states that the elements of a joint venture are: "(1) a community of
interest in the performance of a common purpose, (2) joint control or right of control, (3) a
joint proprietary interest in the subject matter, (4) a right to share in the profits, and (5) a
duty to share in any losses sustained." G. GLICKMAN, 15 BusiNESS OnomZAMIONS § 2.03[7]
(1981).
218. The following hypothetical situation is offered as an example: A lettuce grower in
Michigan sells fifty percent of the interest in its business and trademark to a lettuce grower
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Several cases have recognized that marks may be jointly and
concurrently used in nonregistration settings. In California Fruit
Growers Exchange v. Windsor Beverages,21e for example, the court
sanctioned a contractual agreement between two plaintiffs in
which each granted the other the right to employ the same
mark. 0 The court thus recognized that joint ownership of marks
can be created by contract under common-law principles. Neither
the PTO nor other courts have followed these cases in joint regis-
tration proceedings.
Similarly, the PTO has not analogized concurrent use registra-
tions to joint applicant registration. Concurrent use registration al-
lows two parties to use the same mark when there is a territorial
distinction between the distribution areas of the parties' marked
goods."' As with joint venture registration, this method of joint
ownership is of limited use because it requires territorial division
of distribution. Because joint applicant registration of trademarks
is theoretically available, circuitous alternative methods are costly,
inefficient, and unnecessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
Non solum quid licet, sed quid est conveniens, est con-
siderandum; quia nihil quod est inconveniens est licitum."2
The PTO can easily change its policy on joint ownership of
trademarks. The Lanham Act already regulates all forms of mark
ownership, making statutory amendment unnecessary to imple-
ment the change. The PTO should delete all negative language re-
lating to joint ownership of marks from the TMEP, and allow
mark owners to freely take advantage of joint applicant status.
A large body of case law already exists covering joint use of
marks by licensees and joint venturers. Successful agency and judi-
in Florida. A contract between the parties allows each mark owner to sell lettuce under the
mark exclusively during one-half of the year. Neither grower will control the other, share
profits, or combine labor. Both are willing to rely on the contractual promise of the other
that only the highest grade lettuce will be sold under the mark during the respective six-
month periods.
219. 118 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1941).
220. Id. at 151; accord California Packing Corp. v. Sun-Maid Raisin Growers, 81 F.2d
674 (9th Cir. 1936); Waukesha Hygeia Mineral Springs Co. v. Hygeia Sparkling Distilled
Water Co., 63 F. 438 (7th Cir. 1894).
221. See generally E. VANDENBURGH, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE § 10.11(e) (2d
ed. 1968 & Supp. 1979) (general discussion of concurrent use).
222. Not only what is lawful, but what is proper or convenient, is to be considered;
because nothing that is inconvenient is lawful.
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cial control in these situations exemplifies that joint ownership of
marks poses no threat to the efficient function of our trademark
system. More important, because the benefits of federal trademark
legislation inure to both consumers and mark owners, its protec-
tions should not be arbitrarily denied to either. Thus, when joint
applicant status is proper, the PTO should encourage and permit
its use.
